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Technological revolutions and the evolution of industrial
structures. Assessing the impact of new technologies
upon size, pattern of growth and boundaries of the firms∗
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†LEM, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy
‡Bocconi University, Milano, Italy
§University of Brescia, Italy
Abstract
In this work we discuss the impact of the new ICT techno-economic paradigm upon
the vertical and horizontal boundaries of the firm and ask whether the change in the
sources of competitive advantage has resulted in changes in the size distribution of firms
and also in the degree of concentration of industries. Drawing both on firm-level and
national statistical data we assess the evolution of the overall balances between the ac-
tivities which are integrated within organizations and those which occur through market
interactions.
While the new paradigm entails “revolutionary” changes in the domain of technology,
the modification in industrial structures has been somewhat more incremental. Certainly,
the vertical and horizontal boundaries of firms have changed and together one is observing
a turnover in the club of biggest world firms accounting also for a shift in the relative
importance of industrial sectors. Nonetheless, we do not observe an abrupt fading of the
Chandlerian multidivisional corporation in favour of smaller less-integrated firms.
Keywords
New techno-economic paradigm; Organizational change; Vertical integration;
Boundaries of the firm; Visible hand.
∗The statistical exercises which follow would not have been possible without the valuable help of the Italian
Statistical Office (ISTAT) and in particular of Roberto Monducci and Andrea Mancini and of the French
Statistical Office (INSEE). The data have been elaborated by one of the author (G.D.) in collaboration with
M.G. on Italian data and Nadia Jacoby on French data fulfilling all the obligation on non-diffusion of the
data involved in the agreement of access. We are grateful to several partecipants to the “6th International
Colloquium in Business History”, Bocconi University and to the conference “Innovation and Competition in
the New Economy” University of Milan Bicocca for the useful comments.
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1 Introduction
There is little doubt that over the last three decades the world economy has witnessed the
emergence of a cluster of new technologies - that is a new broad techno-economic paradigm
in the sense of Freeman and Perez (1988) - centered on electronic-based information and
communication technologies. Such ICT technologies did not only give rise to new industries
but, even more importantly, deeply transformed incumbent industries (and for that matter
also service activities), their organizational patterns, and their drivers of competitive success.
Granted such “revolutionary” features of the emerging ICT-based (and possibly life science-
based) technologies in manufacturing and services, what has been their impact upon the
vertical and horizontal boundaries of the firms? What is the evidence supporting the view
according to which the new techno-economic paradigm is conducive to a progressive fading
away of the Chandlerian multidivisional corporation, which was at the center of the previous
techno-economic paradigm, in favour of more specialized, less vertically integrated structures?
Is it true that large firms are generally loosing their advantage in favour of smaller ones? And
more generally, how robust is the evidence, if any, of a “vanishing visible hand” (Langlois,
2003) in favour of a more market-centered organization of economic activities?
In this work we address these issues drawing both on several pieces of circumstantial
evidence and on firm-level statistical data. In fact, if the sources of competitive advantage
conditional on firm size had significantly changed, this should reflect also on changes in the
size distribution of firms, on their growth profiles and on the degrees of concentration of
industries. These are the variables we analyze in Section 2, together with some evidence
on the relationship between size and innovation, on entry and exit, and on job creation in
different size classes. Since, plausibly, the mark of a hypothetical “revolution” in the forms of
economic organization should be found quite universally, when possible we try to disentangle
those properties that are country- and industry-specific and others which robustly apply across
national boarders and at different levels of aggregation.
In a nutshell, the evidence that we analyze does not support any notion of revolution,
but just hints at detectable but rather incremental changes in the size distribution in favour
of smaller size classes, which might however have already stopped in some countries. Size
distributions are, of course, a very rough indicator of underlying patterns of competitive
advantage and of inter-organizational division of labour. In Section 3 we present a theoretical
framework able to capture such underlying dynamics in terms of processes of market selection
and of vertical integration (disintegration). Such an exercise allows also to identify different
types of firms even when of a similar size.
Building on the foregoing statistical evidence and on an evolutionary conceptual frame-
work on size dynamics, we turn to a “qualitative” discussion of change in the organization of
industries associated with the new techno-economic paradigm, and discuss the relationship,
between changing industrial structures, the dynamics of horizontal and vertical boundaries of
firms, and the patterns of division of labour in general and of innovative labour in particular.
The bottom line is that certainly the new paradigm has significantly influenced both the firm
boundaries and the patterns of inter-organizational division of labour. However, there is hardly
any sign of a “third Industrial Revolution”, at least if by the latter one means a revolution
in the role of the “visible hand” of organizations (as distinct from market exchanges) and in
the relative competitive advantages of size such as compared to previous phases of capitalist
development.
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Figure 1: (Left) Size distribution of “world” largest firms (sales measures). (Right) Right cumulated distri-
bution. All publicly quoted firms with more than 500 employees from the Osiris (2005) databank (logscale).
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Figure 2: Size distribution (employment measures) of firms with more than 20 employees (logscale): France
(left) and Italy (right).
2 Structure and dynamics of industries: some “stylized
facts” and long-term trends
Let us begin by focusing on the invariances and changes in the structure of industries and
growth processes,1 trying to distinguish from the very beginning among those regularities
which are common to all industrial sectors and those which reveal a high degree of sectoral or
national specificities.
2.1 Size distributions
The skewness of size distributions, over an impressively wide support, is probably the most
known “stylized facts” concerning industrial structures. Such a regularity holds true inde-
pendently of the unit of observation (might it be the firm or the establishment) and of the
chosen proxy for size (might it be sales, value added, or number of employees). In fact at a
first approximation and at the aggregate manufacturing level the distribution of firms’ size is
1Part of this section borrows from Dosi, Marsili, Orsenigo, and Salvatore (1995); Dosi (2006). See also the
special issues of Industrial and Corporate Change, 1997 and International Journal of Industrial Organization,
1997.
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Figure 3: Zipf fit of Sales distribution for Fortune 500 firms, various years.
well described by a Pareto distribution.2
The (cumulative) probability density function, of Pareto distribution of discrete random
variables is
Pr[s ≥ si] =
(
s0
si
)α
(1)
where s0 is the smallest firm size and si ≥ s0 is the size of the i-th firm, as increasingly
ranked. In the following, one of the statistics that we will show is the right-cumulated function
F (s) = (as)−α (2)
This statistics are first way to characterize the density in the population of different size
classes. Pareto law (eq. 1) under the restriction that α = 1, reduces to so-called Zipf law3
linking the log of the rank and log of the variable being analyzed
srβ = A (3)
where r is the rank and s, in our case, is a proxy for size (choosing sales, value added, or
employees do not significantly affect the analysis: cf. Bottazzi, Cefis, Dosi, and Secchi (2007)).
2For a classical discussion see Ijiri and Simon (1977). More recent evidence is in Axtell (2001) and Marsili
(2005).
3The Zipf distribution is a discrete, one-parameter, univariate distribution that has been used to describe
various physical and social phenomena that are highly skewed (Axtell, 2001; Newman, 2005).
4
Table 1: Fortune 500; Zipf fit. Linear and Quadratic Models.
Year Linear Model Quadratic Model
α β α β γ
1955
9.871 -0.931 8.548 -0.263 -0.077
(0.083) (0.015) (0.204) (0.089) (0.009)
1970
11.069 -0.928 9.342 -0.056 -0.100
(0.103) (0.019) (0.249) (0.124) (0.011)
1980
12.506 -0.997 10.704 -0.087 -0.104
(0.106) (0.019) (0.499) (0.149) (0.010)
1990
13.143 -1.059 11.254 -0.105 -0.109
(0.119) (0.118) (0.181) (0.077) (0.008)
2000
13.254 -0.809 11.727 -0.038 -0.088
(0.096) (0.017) (0.185) (0.078) (0.008)
2005
13.649 -0.843 12.264 -0.143 -0.080
(0.087) (0.016) (0.130) (0.056) (0.005)
5% statistically significant coefficients are in bold
The largest firm is assigned rank 1. β and A are parameters, the former being an indicator of
the degree of concentration of whatever measure in the population. Zipf plots are the other
statistics that we shall use to characterize firm size distribution.
Figure 1 and 2 display the kernel estimate of the density of firm size for the world medium-
large publicly quoted companies and for France and Italy.4 (The reader should not pay too
much attention to the smaller-size densities which are affected by the truncation of the obser-
vation at a given threshold, in these sample at 20 employees.5)
The evidence shows that the skewness in the distribution is very robust and quite invariant
over time. Also note that skewness and the width of the support are not results of an ad hoc
choice of the proxy for size (recall for example that Figure 1 is based on sales measures and
Figure 2 on employment).6
The relative stability of the (nearly) Pareto upper tail of the distribution is confirmed by
the Fortune 500 evidence since 1955 over which we estimate both the linear and quadratic
form of eq. 3, that is
log si = α− β log ri + εi (4)
and
log si = α− γ(log ri)
2 + εi (5)
4More detailed information on the database employed for the empirical analysis is provided in the Appendix.
5Plots are computed on the logarithms of normalized values, so that the distribution is centered to zero,
with densities presented in 64 equispaced points using an Epanenchnikov kernel.
6On the stability over time of such asymmetric distributions, see also, among the others Armington (1986),
Hall (1987), Storey (1994), Bottazzi and Secchi (2003a).
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Figure 4: Zipf fit of sectors grouped according to Pavitt taxonomy, Italian and French manufacturing industry.
where α = logA. The estimates (see figure 3 and table 1) while highlighting the (rough)
fit of the Zipf relation in its canonic (linear) form, also reveal that if anything has changed in
the size distribution of the top firms, this has been far from dramatic: consider the coefficients
β in the linear estimation.
To repeat, although the approximation of the distribution with Pareto (Zipf) ones are
highly imperfect ones, as discussed at greater length in Dosi, Marsili, Orsenigo, and Salvatore
(1995), the skewness property is extremely robust. Further, the coefficients of the Pareto (Zipf)
fits differ across countries but display similarity at the level of broadly defined manufacturing
aggregates.
2.2 Sectoral specificities
As conjectured on the ground of an evolutionary model in Dosi, Marsili, Orsenigo, and Salva-
tore (1995) and empirically shown in Bottazzi, Cefis, Dosi, and Secchi (2007) on Italian data,
disaggregated size distributions continue to display skewness and a wide support. That is, co-
existence of firms with very different sizes - but the departures from a Pareto-shape are often
very wide (sometimes the distributions are even bimodal or trimodal). The structure of each
industry, however, is the outcome of its evolutionary history, in turn driven by the underlying
patterns of technological and organizational learning and the competitive interactions (more
on this in section 3, below). In particular industries differ in term of (a) intensity of innovative
efforts and even more through which they undertake (e.g. through formal R&D, learning by
doing, learning by using, etc.); (b) their revealed rates of innovation; (c) the rates of productiv-
6
Table 2: Zipf fit. Linear and Quadratic Models. Our Elaboration on Micro.1 and EAE databank.
SECTOR Year Linear Model Quadratic Model
α β α β γ
ITA - Supplier Dominated 1989
17.263 -1.058 11.131 0.743 -0.127
(0.065) (0.008) (0.399) (0.110) (0.007)
ITA - Supplier Dominated 1997
18.028 -1.122 11.264 0.878 -0.142
(0.074) (0.009) (0.447) (0.124) (0.008)
FRA - Supplier Dominated 1997
19.134 -1.061 13.477 0.531 -0.108
(0.022) (0.002) (0.053) (0.014) (0.001)
FRA - Supplier Dominated 2002
19.297 -1.064 13.714 0.524 -0.108
(0.023) (0.003) (0.053) (0.014) (0.001)
ITA - Scale Intensive 1989
19.223 -1.310 13.833 0.418 -0.132
(0.080) (0.010) (0.499) (0.149) (0.010)
ITA - Scale Intensive 1997
19.861 -1.370 14.313 0.479 -0.146
(0.092) (0.012) (0.551) (0.170) (0.012)
FRA - Scale Intensive 1997
21.201 -1.418 16.807 0.026 -0.113
(0.027) (0.003) (0.040) (0.012) (0.001)
FRA - Scale Intensive 2002
21.273 -1.402 16.234 0.252 -0.129
(0.030) (0.004) (0.039) (0.012) (0.001)
ITA - Specialized Suppliers 1989
16.068 -1.017 12.505 0.254 -0.107
(0.081) (0.011) (0.271) (0.088) (0.007)
ITA - Specialized Suppliers 1997
17.137 -1.120 13.048 0.353 -0.125
(0.095) (0.013) (0.364) (0.121) (0.009)
FRA - Specialized Suppliers 1997
18.381 -1.133 14.673 0.207 -0.114
(0.033) (0.004) (0.045) (0.015) (0.001)
FRA - Specialized Suppliers 2002
18.821 -1.177 15.376 0.071 -0.107
(0.031) (0.004) (0.042) (0.014) (0.001)
ITA - Science Based 1989
17.777 -1.458 13.578 0.428 -0.195
(0.195) (0.033) (0.549) (0.220) (0.021)
ITA - Science Based 1997
18.405 -1.547 14.745 0.171 -0.185
(0.195) (0.035) (0.360) (0.151) (0.015)
FRA - Science Based 1997
10.502 -0.654 3.339 2.169 -0.260
(0.123) (0.019) (0.254) (0.093) (0.008)
FRA - Science Based 2002
10.557 -0.653 3.332 2.175 -0.259
(0.012) (0.019) (0.252) (0.092) (0.008)
ITA - All Manufacturing 1989
19.430 -1.188 12.683 0.604 -0.115
(0.047) (0.005) (0.393) (0.099) (0.006)
ITA - All Manufacturing 1997
20.305 -1.267 12.915 0.732 -0.131
(0.054) (0.006) (0.444) (0.114) (0.007)
FRA - All Manufacturing 1997
21.354 -1.219 15.788 0.232 -0.091
(0.015) (0.002) (0.040) (0.010) (0.001)
FRA - All Manufacturing 2002
21.536 -1.222 15.718 0.299 -0.096
(0.018) (0.002) (0.039) (0.010) (0.006)
5 % statistically significant coefficients are in bold
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Figure 5: Zipf fit of sectors grouped according to Pavitt taxonomy, Italian and French manufacturing industry.
ity growth; and (d) the patterns of inter-organizational division of labor. (More on this issues
in Dosi (1988) Malerba and Orsenigo (1995, 1997), Dosi, Orsenigo, and Sylos-Labini (2005)).
Plausibly, such differences might entail size-biased capabilities to innovate. Together, they
certainly yield different potentials to grow conditional on the specific “regimes” of technolog-
ical learning.7 One of the aims of the well-known taxonomy by Keith Pavitt (Pavitt, 1984)
is precisely to capture such relations on maps “industry types” (defined according to their
learning modes) and firm size. To recall, Pavitt taxonomy comprises four groups of sectors8,
namely
(i) “supplier dominated”, sectors whose innovative opportunities, mostly come through the
acquisition of new pieces of machinery and new intermediate inputs (textile, clothing,
metal products belong to this category);
(ii) “specialized suppliers”, including producers of industrial machinery and equipments;
(iii) “scale intensive” sectors, the sheer scale of production influence the ability to exploit in-
novative opportunities partly endogenously generated and partly stemming from science-
based inputs (see below);
7Here one should in fact distinguish between “discontinuous” complex-product industries such as auto-
mobiles, white goods and other consumer durables vs. “continuous” flow industries such as refining or steel
making.
8The Appendix report an accurate description of the mapping we employed to relate a particular industrial
activity, i.e. industrial classification code, into the corresponding “Pavitt’s groups” see the Appendix.
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(iv) “science-based” industries, whose innovative opportunities co-evolve, especially in the
early stage of their life with advances in pure and applied sciences (micro electronics,
informatics, drugs and bioengineering in particular are good example).
Pavitt’s evidence was drawing upon the characteristic of a sample of British innovators. Do
different family of industries display diverse size distribution profiles also over greater samples9
including of course innovating and non-innovating firms?
Figure 4 and 5 and Table 2 presents Zipf estimates on Italian and French manufacturing
sectors.
The results do indeed vindicate the notion that technology-specific facts exert a significant
influence on industry structures10. Consider again in particular the linear model (with all the
foregoing caveats in mind) and recall that, roughly speaking, a higher absolute value of the
β coefficient means a higher size advantage of the biggest firms. In fact, size advantages are
relatively more important in scale intensive sectors (not surprising as such, but corroborating
the soundness of the taxonomy) and in science-based ones, while they are least important in
“supplier dominated” sectors.
Results for the French case interestingly lend support to the hypothesis of a significant
role played by the specific technological regime in shaping the industry structure of different
sectors. This is apparent comparing the coefficients for France and Italy in Table 2. Estimated
β belonging to the same groups are similar both for France and Italy, with the exception,
mostly due to a relative smaller number of observations, for science based sectors.
Note also that from the 80’s to the 90’s there is no evidence, so to speak, of a “shrinking
top”. On the contrary, even in a country like Italy, notoriously characterized by a small-firm
bias (see also below) the β coefficient remains constant or slightly increase. In fact, in order
to study more generally the possible changes in industrial structures from the “fordist golden
age” of the 50’s and 60’s to the current period, one would ideally require size distribution for
the major OECD countries over the whole population of firms (at least above some threshold)
going back over time. Unfortunately they are not available. Hence, in order to get some further
hints at the dynamics of industrial structures let us look at the dynamics of the number of
firms and of employment by broad size cohort and at the degree of industrial concentration.
2.3 Number of firms and employment by size classes
Tables 3 and 4 report the distribution fo the number of firms and of employment by size
cohorts. The length of the footnotes to the tables, flagging differences in sources, coverage,
cohort breakdown should warn the reader about too strong inference from such data. With
that in mind, the data do not seem to reveal anything reminding a revolution either with
respect to the percentage distribution of firms or their employment share. At a first look,
Germany, France the U.S. and the U.K. (in terms of employment share, only) do appear to
conform to the story fo a growing hegemony of bigger firms up to the ’70s with a turning
point thereafter. However, in some countries like the U.K., Germany, and Italy the share
of employment in the bigger size cohort continue to fall since (and less so in Japan, too,
with a corresponding growth in the medium-large share11). Conversely, the U.S. evidence
appear to suggest a reversal of such trend with a growing share in the number of big firms in
9In fact, the universe of all firms responding to the Central Statistical Office survey.
10Similar evidence on The Netherlands is discussed in Marsili (2005).
11Firms in the 100-999 cohort.
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Figure 6: Probability densities of the sectoral concentration index D20
4
in terms of total sales, different years
(kernel estimates). The support of these densities is [0.3 0.95]. World’s largest firms Osiris (2005) database.
manufacturing and a growing share in big-size employment in both manufacturing and overall
economy.
2.4 Industrial concentration
Next let us consider in turn proxies for industrial concentration and for geographical one.
Start form the former. Ideally, the measure ought to be calculated on the universe of firms
in a given sector. Short of that, and given the biases associated with the lower size bound in
the Osiris (2005) databank12 we feel safer to consider concentration in the upper tail of the
distribution.
D420(t) =
C4
C20
t = 1982, ..., 2005 (6)
where C4 and C20 are the sums of the market shares of the top 4 and top 20 firms in each
sector, respectively. If a sector is highly concentrated, D420 would near to 1, while it would be
1/5 if all firms were identical.
Figure 6 displays the densities of the concentration measure over the last two decades for
all 3 digit sectors with more than 45 observations. Interestingly, the shapes of the distributions
change a good deal, while the means of the distributions vary much less. The modal value
of the concentration rates falls from the mid-80’s to the mid-90’s (remaining, roughly, stable
thereafter). At the same time the upper tail gets fatter. An increasing number of sectors
displays D420(t) statistics above 0.7, meaning that the first four firms in the “world”, as defined
in the Osiris dataset, in a particular sector, accounts for more than 70% of the top 20 firms
in the same sectoral data record.
Note also that the lower tail seems to be remarkably stable over the last two decades.
This body of evidence in principle is not at all in conflict with the evidence put forward by
Ghemawat and Ghadar (2006) suggesting that market globalization has not in general carried
12Note that the percentage of publicly quoted companies over the total of the size cohort tend to fall with
the latter. However in recent years an increasing but indeterminate percentage also of small companies went
public.
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Table 3: Distribution of firms per size, percentages. Source OECD (2006) ISTAT (1997, 2001)
Country Year 0-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 50-250 100-499 250+ 500+
France
1962a ... 36.91 34.1 13.6 ... 12.8 ... 2.7
1977a ... 28.41 38.3 14.6 ... 15.1 ... 3.6
1990a ... 34.91 37.8 13.4 ... 11.5 ... 2.5
1996b 82.7 7.2 6.0 2.0 ... 1.8 ... 0.3
1997b 82.4 7.3 6.2 2.0 ... 1.8 ... 0.3
2000b 82.1 7.3 6.4 1.9 ... 1.9 ... 0.4
2001b 81.8 7.5 6.4 2.0 ... 1.9 ... 0.4
2003b 82.8 7.2 6.0 ... 3.2 ... 0.8 ...
Germany
1967a 58.92 ... 17.93 9.8 ... 11.0 ... 2.5
1977a 56.62 ... 20.23 10.2 ... 10.3 ... 2.6
1990a 60.32 ... 17.73 9.6 ... 10.0 ... 2.4
2000b 67.3 16.3 7.4 4.1 ... 4.1 ... 0.8
2001b 64.0 18.8 7.7 4.3 ... 4.3 ... 0.9
2002b 62.1 18.4 8.9 ... 8.4 ... 2.2 ...
2004b 59.9 21.4 8.4 ... 8.2 ... 2.1 ...
UK
1968a 62.52 ... 10.33 10.4 ... 13.4 ... 3.4
1977a 54.3 15.0 13.6 6.8 ... 8.1 ... 2.3
1990a 66.2 13.3 10.2 4.5 ... 4.8 ... 1.0
1996b 71.5 12.1 8.8 3.4 ... 3.5 ... 0.7
1997b 72.0 12.1 8.4 3.3 ... 3.5 ... 0.7
2000b 70.7 13.4 8.3 3.6 ... 3.4 ... 0.6
2001b 71.7 12.2 8.8 3.5 ... 3.2 ... 0.6
2002b 71.2 12.5 9.0 ... 5.9 ... 1.4 ...
2003b 72.9 11.8 8.5 ... 5.5 ... 1.3 ...
Italy
1971a ... 48.01 31.4 11.2 ... 8.2 ... 1.3
1981a ... 57.31 27.4 8.4 ... 6.2 ... 0.9
1991a ... 59.01 28.5 7.0 ... 4.8 ... 0.7
1996b 83.7 9.5 4.8 1.1 ... 0.8 ... 0.1
1997b 83.1 9.7 5.1 1.2 ... 0.8 ... 0.1
1998b 83.5 9.6 4.8 1.2 ... 0.8 ... 0.1
1999b 83.5 9.6 4.8 1.1 ... 0.8 ... 0.1
2000b 83.5 9.6 4.7 1.2 ... 0.8 ... 0.1
2001b 83.3 9.8 4.8 1.2 ... 0.8 ... 0.1
2002b 83.4 9.7 4.7 ... 1.9 ... 0.3 ...
2004b 82.8 10.1 4.8 ... 2.0 ... 0.3 ...
Japan
1967a 72.7 13.9 8.1 2.9 ... 2.0 ... 0.3
1975a 76.2 12.3 7.0 2.5 ... 1.7 ... 0.3
1990a 73.7 11.9 9.4 2.9 ... 2.0 ... 0.3
1999c 71.6 13.5 9.2 3.0 ... 2.58 ... 0.29
2001c 71.6 13.5 9.2 3.0 ... 2.58 ... 0.29
2004c 72.1 13.2 9.0 3.0 ... 2.58 ... 0.29
USA
1972d 88.8 5.9 4.65 ... ... 0.6 ... 0.1
1977d 89.4 5.6 4.35 ... ... 0.6 ... 0.1
1982d 80.9 10.4 7.55 ... ... 1.0 ... 0.2
1988e 78.8 10.9 8.75 ... ... 1.3 ... 0.3
1992e 78.9 10.8 8.65 ... ... 1.4 ... 0.3
1997e 78.8 10.7 8.85 ... ... 1.4 ... 0.3
1999e 78.5 10.8 8.95 ... ... 1.5 ... 0.3
2000e 78.2 10.9 9.15 ... ... 1.5 ... 0.3
2003e 78.6 10.8 8.95 ... ... 1.5 ... 0.3
(a) Source OECD (1995). (1) Only firms bigger than 10 employees are reported.
(b) Source EUROSTAT (2006). (2) The smallest size cohort has the range 0-24.
(c) Source Japan (2006); Incorporated firms, all private sectors. (3) Cohort of range 25-49.
(d) Source CENSUS (1972, 1977, 1982). (4) Establishments, rather than firms are considered.
(e) Source CENSUS (2006); Incorporated firms, all private sectors. (5) Size cohort 20-99.
(o) Source OECD (2006); Manufacturing sectors only. (6) 100-249.
(7) 250-499.
(8) 100-999.
(9) 1000+.
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Table 4: Employment share per size cohort, percentages. Source OECD (2006) ISTAT (1997, 2001)
Country Year 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 50-250 100-499 250+ 500+
France
1962a ... 4.71 10.0 8.8 ... 24.5 ... 51.9
1977a ... 3.11 9.3 7.9 ... 24.4 ... 55.3
1990a ... 5.71 13.4 10.4 ... 25.7 ... 44.7
1996b 13.0 6.3 13.1 8.4 ... 23.5 ... 35.7
1997b 13.1 6.2 13.4 8.4 ... 23.7 ... 35.2
2000b 12.2 6.2 12.9 8.5 ... 24.3 ... 35.9
2001b 11.8 6.3 12.7 8.5 ... 24.5 ... 36.2
2003 12.1 6.5 12.5 ... 22.1 ... 46.9 ...
Germany
1967a 3.92 ... 6.23 7.5 ... 25.2 ... 57.2
1977a 3.92 ... 6.93 7.7 ... 23.5 ... 58.0
1990a 4.72 ... 6.83 7.8 ... 24.1 ... 56.6
1996b ... ... 8.3 10.0 ... 29.3 ... 52.4
2000b 7.2 7.1 7.5 8.8 ... 25.8 ... 43.6
2001b 7.0 7.7 7.4 8.7 ... 25.8 ... 43.4
2002b 6.7 6.7 7.8 ... 23.7 . 55.1 ...
2004b 6.6 8.5 7.7 ... 23.6 ... 53.6 ...
UK
1968a 6.82 ... 4.23 8.0 ... 31.6 ... 49.5
1977a 3.8 3.2 6.2 7.1 ... 25.6 ... 54.3
1990a 5.8 4.4 9.6 9.3 ... 30.0 ... 40.9
1996b 11.4 6.8 11.2 9.7 ... 28.1 ... 32.8
1997b 9.4 7.1 10.9 9.5 ... 29.5 ... 33.6
2000b 10.0 7.6 10.5 10.0 ... 28.3 ... 33.6
2001b 10.1 7.2 11.7 10.4 ... 28.0 ... 32.6
2002b 10.5 7.5 12.1 ... 26.0 ... 43.9 ...
2003b 10.9 7.4 12.0 ... 25.4 ... 44.3 ...
Italy
1971a ... 9.81 14.6 11.8 24.1 ... 39.7
1981a ... 15.11 16.2 11.6 23.8 ... 33.4
1991a ... 19.51 20.2 11.8 22.3 ... 26.2
1995a 24.1 14.7 25.55 ... 10.06 6.27 ... 19.4
1996b 24.7 15.1 16.3 9.2 ... 16.8 ... 17.9
1997b 24.4 15.1 16.6 9.7 ... 17.1 ... 17.1
1999b 25.3 15.1 16.6 9.5 ... 17.1 ... 16.4
2000b 25.1 15.1 16.2 9.6 ... 17.5 ... 16.5
2001b 25.1 15.2 16.0 9.9 ... 17.4 ... 16.4
2002b 25.5 15.1 15.9 ... 20.7 ... 22.8 16.4
2004b 25.5 15.3 16.1 ... 21.0 ... 22.1 ...
Japan
1967a 16.4 11.2 14.3 11.3 ... 22.1 ... 24.8
1975a 19.1 11.3 14.1 11.1 ... 21.2 ... 23.1
1990a 17.6 10.1 17.0 12.2 ... 23.1 ... 20.0
1999c 10.6 8.6 13.2 9.8 ... 28.48 ... 29.59
2001c 10.8 8.7 13.1 9.7 ... 28.38 ... 29.49
2004c 11.0 8.6 13.0 9.9 ... 29.38 ... 28.29
USA
1972d 13.4 8.6 19.35 ... ... 12.2 ... 46.5
1977d 13.2 8.4 18.55 ... ... 12.4 ... 47.5
1982d 16.5 9.5 19.85 ... ... 13.0 ... 41.3
1988e 12.6 8.3 19.25 ... ... 14.5 ... 45.5
1992e 12.3 8.0 18.45 ... ... 14.3 ... 47.0
1997e 11.6 7.6 18.15 ... ... 14.5 ... 48.2
1999e 11.1 7.3 17.85 ... ... 14.1 ... 49.7
2000e 10.8 7.3 17.85 ... ... 14.3 ... 49.9
2003e 11.0 7.3 17.85 ... ... 14.5 ... 49.3
(a) Source OECD (1995). (1) Only firms bigger than 10 employees are reported.
(b) Source EUROSTAT (2006). (2) The smallest size cohort has the range 0-24.
(c) Source Japan (2006); Incorporated firms, all private sectors. (3) Cohort of range 25-49.
(d) Source CENSUS (1972, 1977, 1982). (4) Establishments, rather than firms are considered.
(e) Source CENSUS (2006); Incorporated firms, all private sectors. (5) Size cohort 20-99.
(o) Source OECD (2006); Manufacturing sectors only. (6) 100-249.
(7) 250-499.
(8) 100-999.
(9) 1000+.
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Figure 7: Histogram of the distribution of sales for biggest firms worldwide per geographic location. Our
elaboration on Osiris (2005)
along an increasing industrial concentration (under all the ambiguities of measurement of
corporate sales vs. production, etc.). Our somewhat symmetric point is that the new techno-
economic paradigm has not brought along either flattening and shrinking size distributions
and with that generally falling measures of industrial concentration across sectors and across
countries.
A quite distinct issue concerns the geographical concentration (across countries) of indus-
trial activities. Of course, the original legal location of any one firm is a very noisy indication
for the location of the overall activities of each large firm (most likely MNCs). Still the na-
tional origin of world top-size firms is informative in its own right. Moreover, it continues to
hold true that core activities such as strategic management and R&D are mostly performed in
country of origin (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2001). At this level of analysis first the evidence
on the (Fortune 500) upper tail of the size distribution displays a persistent dominance of
US-based firms (cf. 7). However, second, the relative balance amongst big firms13 has shifted
from the ’80s to the ’90s in favour of non-US firms. It is a decline which operated mostly in
favour of Japan and to a less extent of European firms in the last part of the 20th century. It
arrested over the latest period, statistically highlighting a European and Japanese slowdown
vis-a´-vis non-OECD countries, together with the emergence of newer players (e.g. Korean and
Chinese oligopolists).
2.5 The dynamics of corporate growth
Clearly, the observed industrial structures - including size distributions and degrees of concen-
tration - are the outcome of the underlying processes of growth of incumbent firms, together
with the processes of entry and exit.
Concerning the former, a common starting point in the literature, and also a handy instru-
ment to assess if and how size influences growth, is the so-called Gibrat law (for a discussion by
13With ‘bigness’ defined on the much larger meter of Osiris firms.
13
Table 5: Total Sales and Number of firms for each country. Fortune Global 500 (2003). Sales are in billions
of U.S. dollars.
Country
Total
Sales
Number
of firms
Country
Total
Sales
Number
of firms
United States 5841 189 Russia 62 3
Japan 2181 82 Brazil 61 3
Germany 1363 34 Belgium 60 3
France 1246 37 Norway 60 2
United Kingdom 1079 35 India 60 4
The Netherlands 388 12
Belgium/The
Netherlands
57 1
Switzerland 382 12 Mexico 49 1
China 358 15 Venezuela 46 1
Italy 300 8 Denmark 35 2
South Korea 266 11 Luxembourg 29 1
United Kingdom/
The Netherlands
250 2 Malaysia 26 1
Canada 185 13 Singapore 15 1
Spain 162 7 Taiwan 14 1
Australia 107 7 Ireland 12 1
Sweden 96 6 Thailand 12 1
Finland 71 4
Total 14,873 500
one of us, cf. Dosi (2006); reviews of the literature are in Sutton (1997) and Lotti, Santarelli,
and Vivarelli (2003)).
Let
si(t+ 1) = α+ θisi(t) + εi(t) (7)
where si(.) are the log-sizes of firm i at times t, t+1 and α is the sector-wide (both nominal
and real) component of growth.
Gibrat law in its strong form suggests that
(a) θi = 1 for every i
(b) εi(t) is an independent identically and normally distributed random variable with zero
mean.
Hypothesis (a) states the “law of proportionate effect”: growth is a multiplicative process
independent of initial conditions. In other words there are no systematical scale effects.
Note that were one to find θi > 1 one ought to observe a persistent tendency toward
monopoly. Conversely θi < 1 would be evidence corroborating regression-to-the-mean, and,
indirectly, witness of some underlying “optimal size” attractor.
Overall, hypothesis (a) which is indeed the object of most inquiries gets a mixed support:
(i) most often, smaller firms - on average - grow faster (under the caveat that one generally
considers small surviving firms);
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(ii) otherwise, no strikingly robust relationship appears between size and average rates of
growth (cf. Mansfield (1962), Hall (1987), Kumar (1985), Bottazzi, Cefis, and Dosi
(2002), and Bottazzi and Secchi (2003b), among others), but the coefficient θi is generally
quite close to one;
(iii) the relationship between size and growth is modulated by the age of firms themselves -
broadly speaking, with age exerting negative effects on growth rates, but positive effects
on survival probabilities, at least after some post-infancy threshold (Evans, 1987b,a).14
[Recent works have also highlighted a rich, non-Gaussian structure in the shocks εi(t): cf.
Bottazzi and Secchi (2006) on US firms and Bottazzi, Cefis, Dosi, and Secchi (2007) on Italy.
The discussion of this property would however take us too far away from the thrust of this
work.]
For our purposes here let us retain the idea that corporate growth is (and has always been,
as far back as our statistics go) a multiplicative process driven by factors that on average have
little to do with size either way: that is, size does not seem (now as well as 40 years ago)
either to foster or to hinder growth, at least above a certain threshold, with faster growth and
higher mortality rates in the smaller cohorts.
2.6 Size, innovativeness and efficiency
As known, the influence of size upon innovative capabilities and/or revealed rates of innovation
has long been debated in the literature, often under the misplaced heading of the so-called
“Schumpeterian hypothesis” according to which size as such would confer an innovative ad-
vantage (for discussions cfr. Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Baldwin and Scott (1987), Cohen
and Levin (1989) Cohen (1995), and Symeonidis (1996)).
The evidence, again, does not seem to support any strong relation between size and inno-
vativeness. So, for example, Scherer (1965), well before the current technological revolution,
analyzes the relation between sales, R&D employment, and patents over a few hundred big
firms and finds an inverted U-shaped relation between sales and R&D intensities. However, on
quite similar data, Soete (1979) identifies strong intersectoral differences, with several sectors
displaying “increasing returns” in the relation size-innovativeness. Yet later, Bound, Cum-
mins, Griliches, and Jaffe (1984), on a larger sample, find again the inverted U, with the peak
of innovativeness in the medium size cohorts. The sectoral specificities of the revealed cor-
relation between innovativeness and size is explicitly addressed in Acs and Audretsch (1987)
and Acs and Audretsch (1990), which find a positive correlation in 156 industrial sectors, a
negative one in 122, and negligible rates of innovation -as they measure them- irrespectively
of size in 170 sectors. Pavitt, Robson, and Townsend (1987) analyzes innovativeness -using a
discrete innovation count from the SPRU database- and find a U relation (not an inverted one
!) with small-medium and very big firms displaying the highest propensity to innovate. Such
a relation, however, shows strong sectoral specificities (cfr. the taxonomy in Pavitt (1984)).
So, for instance, innovative firms are likely to be rather small in industrial machinery; big
firms prevail in chemicals, metal working, aerospace and electrical equipment, while many
“science-based” sectors (such as electronics and pharmaceuticals) tend to display a bimodal
distribution with high rates of innovation of small and very large firms.
14Moreover, the relationship between size and growth appears to be influenced by the stage of development
of particular industries along their life cycles (Geroski and Mazzucato, 2002).
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Figure 8: Net change in employment, 3rd 1992 - 1st quarter 2005, in thousands, seasonally adjusted. Source
Business Employment Dynamics, BLS (BLS, 2005).
The bottom line here, in agreement with Cohen and Levin (1989), is that the results on the
relation between size and innovativeness are “inconclusive” and “fragile”. And, in fact, a good
deal of the evidence on such relationship is further weakened, first, by endemic sample selection
biases: quite often one compares the universe of medium-big firms with a biased sample of
small ones (indeed, those which innovate). Second, even when one finds size-innovativeness
correlations, one should be extremely careful in offering any causal interpretation. It could well
be, for example, that in some circumstances being bigger is conducive to innovation (aerospace
is a good example), but the opposite direction of causation is generally at work too: a firm is
big today precisely because it has been innovative in the past (for example this is a bit the
story of Intel).
What about the relationship between size and production efficiency as measured by inputs
productivity? We discuss the issue at greater length in Dosi and Grazzi (2006) where we
explore such a relation at disaggregated levels in the Italian case. Again, the data seem to
suggest either, roughly, constant returns to scale, or, a mild evidence of a continuing role of
economies of scale (plausibly associated with scale-biased forms of mechanization/automation
of production).
2.7 Entry, exit and market turbulence
The evidence discussed so far lend support to the existence of some powerful invariances in
industrial structures (concerning for example size distribution and growth processes) which
appear to hold throughout the current technological revolution. These persistent properties,
however, should not be taken as evidence of “business as usual” and even less of any sort of
long-term equilibrium.
On the contrary, underlying the foregoing statistical regularities one observes indeed the
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Table 6: Average percent sharea of gross job gain and gross job losses by firm size, 3rd 1992 - 1st quarter
2005, in thousands, seasonally adjusted. Source Business Employment Dynamics, BLS (BLS, 2005).
CATEGORY
Firm size class (number of employees)
1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500-999 1000+
Gross job gains 14.3 11.5 11.9 14.2 9.1 9.8 5.9 4.9 18.4
Expanding firms 7.0 10.6 12.0 15.1 10.0 11.1 6.8 5.7 21.7
Opening firms 51.8 16.0 11.6 9.8 4.3 3.1 1.3 0.9 1.2
Gross job losses 14.6 11.8 12.2 14.4 9.1 9.7 5.8 4.8 17.6
Contracting firms 7.5 11.1 12.3 15.2 10.0 10.8 6.7 5.5 20.9
Closing firms 49.2 15.5 11.7 10.3 4.8 3.9 1.8 1.2 1.6
Net Change 9.9 6.6 8.1 12.1 9.2 11.5 7.3 6.0 29.3
a Share measures the percent of the category represented by each firm size class.
turbulent microeconomics which Metcalfe (2001) calls “restless capitalism”. In fact, an ex-
tremely robust stylized fact which seems to apply irrespectively of periods of observation, of
countries and sectors is the persistent turbulence in the profile of industrial evolution, due
to persistent entry and exit flows and changes in the incumbents’ market shares (see, among
others, Acs and Audretsch (1990), Beesley and Hamilton (1984), Baldwin (1998), Bartelsman
and Doms (2000) and the comprehensive comparative analysis on the patterns of entry and
exit in Bartelsman, Scarpetta, and Schivardi (2005))
Note that relatively high rates of entry are pervasive phenomena even in high capital
intensity industries (Acs and Audretsch (1989, 1991)). The overwhelming majority of entrants
begins with a small size (with the partial exception of those “entrants” which are actually new
subsidiaries of incumbent, sometimes, MNC, firms). Exit rates are quite high too, of the same
order of magnitude of entry flows. Roughly, around half of the entrants is dead after seven
years in all OECD countries (Bartelsman, Scarpetta, and Schivardi, 2005). The evidence on
churning (“rubbish in, rubbish out” dynamics) is quite robust and apparently uncorrelated
with the appearance of a new techno-economic paradigm.
Certainly, a phenomenon which distinguishes the last three decades from the previous
period is the apparent increase in the rates of entry of new firms (generally small startups).
So, for example, gross entry flows in the USA were around 50,000 per year in the early ’50 and
are around 500,000 in the last decade (with a peak of 700,000 in 1988). It is hard to disentangle
the drivers of such a phenomenon. Circumstantial evidence suggests that a significant share
of new firms are in fact spin-offs from incumbent firms (on the characteristics of entrants see
also Bhide´ (2000)). And, indeed, the emergence of a new technological paradigm is likely to
have influenced entry dynamics.
One should avoid any strict identification of entry with “innovative entrepreneurship”, the
latter being a small subset of the former.
Less effort has gone into the investigation of the degree of turbulence in the oligopolistic
core of individual industries. Rather old studies (e.g. Kaplan (1954), Collins and Preston
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(1961), Mermelstein (1969), Bond (1975)) suggest a relatively high stability in the membership
and rankings within such core itself. Broadly in the same vein, Chandler (1990) notes that
96% of the top 200 firms in year 1924 were still present, albeit sometimes under different
denominations in 1958. Louc¸a˜ and Mendonc¸a (2002) resort to Fortune 500 to extend the work
of Chandler. They emphasize the long-term turn over of the membership of the largest firms
group which is probably attributable to change in the dominant techno-economic paradigm.
Come as it may, whatever measure of “turbulence” - including of course death rates - appears
to be much higher among small firms as compared to bigger cohorts (cf. Acs and Audretsch
(1991) and Geroski and Toker (1996)).
In any case, one has to carefully distinguish the relative stability of the oligopolistic core
in many industries from the dynamics in the relative size rankings of top firms (see Section
3, below, for an interpretative framework). Anecdotal evidence goes both ways: examples
that come to mind are, on the “erosion of the oligopolistic leadership” side, General Motors
or Westinghouse, and, on the “oligopolistic emergence” side Microsoft or Nokia. No doubt,
more than two thirds of the first Fortune 500 firms (year 1954) do not appear in current
statistics. However, it does not appear to be a sign of an “organizational revolution” specific
to the currently emerging new techno-economic paradigms but rather a long-term feature of
“restless capitalism” with its persistent emergence of new industrial activities and its changing
weights among them.
A complementary angle from which to look at the organizational changes in contemporary
industry is in terms of gross and net job flows conditional on firm size classes. In the “Fordist
golden age” a good deal of employment creation occurred in medium-large companies. Over
the last three decades the contribution of small firms to job creation seems to have increased
(for much more detailed analyses on the ’80s and early ’90s, cf. Boeri and Cramer (1992)
and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996)). This applies to different degrees to all OECD
countries (OECD, 1994). So for example in the period 1990-95 new production units accounted
in the USA for 69% of the total job creation (and 22% of the total was due to new start-ups).
Interestingly, however, the bias toward small firms in employment creation seems to have
become less pronounced or even reversed in the most recent years, at least in the USA: bigger
firms (with more than 1,000 employees) in the new century are by far the biggest net source
of employment (cf. Table 6 and Figure 8). Small firms (especially start-ups) continue to
be a major source of gross employment creation, but this is matched by impressive rates of
employment destruction, too (cf. again Table 6). This is in fact the employment facet of the
“churning” discussed earlier in terms of entry and death of new firms.
Italy - a country characterized by high rates of new firms formation - is a good case to
the point: new firms are born mainly in rather traditional industries and often display very
low degrees of innovativeness. More important, widespread entry is not a new phenomenon.
As Chandler (1990) himself noted, large integrated firms were mostly concentrated in capital-
intensive and technology-intensive industries, and in a handful of countries. Smaller firms
have been the norm in labor-intensive activities and in many regions of the world. Moreover
note that in both labor-intensive and capital-intensive industries a good deal of entry and exit
has always occurred. The novelty is the relative increase in turbulence.
2.8 Conclusion
Let us summarize the relevant stylized facts highlighted in the previous section:
a) A few OECD countries, especially European ones displays a decline in average firm size
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starting in the late 1970’s early 1980’s. Yet, the decline has not been dramatic. Large
firms still play an important role, especially in terms of output and employment. And
in fact the importance of the largest firms seems to have increased in the US over the
most recent period.
b) At the aggregate level the size distribution of firms is still considerably skewed. In this
respect, a well established and persistent fact, which is robust across countries, is that
the firm size distribution is close to a Pareto one. The picture is more blurred at a
more disaggregate industry level, but the skewness of the distribution remains a robust
property.
c) The science-based industries, and the scale-intensive ones according to the classification
by Pavitt (1984), exhibit a more asymmetric distribution. Circumstantial evidence con-
firms Pavitt’s findings that science-based industries display a higher share of both larger
and smaller firms.
d) The most important change compared to the earlier decades has been the notable in-
crease in the number of new firm entries, especially in the US and partly in the UK.
They are accounted for by start-ups and on many occasions by spin-offs from existing
firms. The new firms account for a significant share of increase in employment gross job
flows and a positive but much lower share net job gains.
e) Since the new entries are accompanied by corresponding high exit rates, the recent
decades have exhibited an increase in industrial turbulence.
f) Finally, while there has been a trend towards globalization, this has not implied greater
oligopolistic concentration worldwide, or a greater concentration of international pro-
duction in the US. However our elaboration show that concentration has not fallen
systematically either, with the mode of concentration measures falling from the ’80s to
the ’90s (and remaining stable thereafter but also with an increase in the number of
highly concentrated sectors).
What does this evidence tell us about the possible emergence of a “new regime” of industrial
organization possibly based on a different balance between small and big firms? In order
to answer the question, let us first spell out some elements of a theory of the processes of
competition and division of labor underlying the continuing co-existence of firms of different
sizes and different organizational and technological characteristics. To do that we ask the
reader to bear with us through some formalism which will help highlighting the main process
at work.
3 Theoretical models and observational implications:
learning, competition and industrial organisation
3.1 Firms size: some introductory remarks
As a starting point for our discussion, it might be useful to begin from some simple identities.
Let us consider an economy composed by m productive activities, which - in a first approxi-
mation - we assume to correspond to specific markets (Mj , j = 1, ..., m). If the assumption
is added that each firm i (i = 1, ..., n) is active exclusively in a single activity / market, its
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size in terms of output, Si, is obviously equal to the total size of the market multiplied by its
market share, fij
Si ≡ fijMj (8)
In the more empirically plausible case of firms characterized by varying degrees of diversi-
fication (among final products) and of vertical integration (abstracting for sake of simplicity
from considering the input-output relations of the economy), the firm’s size is:
Si ≡
∑
j
fijMj (9)
Given these identities, each observed distribution in the Sj needs an interpretation of the
distribution of the shares within each market and among markets, as well as of the dynamics
of the shares themselves and of the total size of the markets.
3.2 Product differentiation, vertical integration and diversification:
the boundaries of firms
Start by noting that rarely each “market” could be simply identified and that it implies and
corresponds to a univocal set of “productive activities”. A first approximation to the first
hypothesis is obviously a homogeneous good. Yet in reality each market usually involves a
collection - changing over time - of imperfectly substitutable goods, even abstracting from the
unavoidable statistical arbitrariness and the resulting aggregation problems. This applies to
products that are a) horizontally differentiated in their characteristics for the final consumer
(Lancaster (1979), Hotelling (1929), Chamberlin (1962) and Robinson (1933)), b) vertically
differentiated in term of some ordering of quality (Shaked and Sutton, 1978) or c) intermediate
products and capital goods with different performances (see among others, Freeman (1982)
and Dosi (1988)).
A fundamental result of this stream of literature is - as it is well known - that many firms
having a non-null measure can coexist occupying different market niches. However, the simple
observation of product differentiation or monopolistic competition as such does not suffice
to support any prediction on the form of the firms’ size distributions. Even (incorrectly)
establishing a direct correlation between firm’s size and the size of the market, one may well
observe that large firms horizontally diversify in many markets.
Consider next “vertical measure” of firms. So far, we have been assuming that to each
product / market was associated a characteristic set of “productive activities”. But ever
since Adam Smith, it is well known that such activities are subject to varying degrees of
“decomposition”, which change over time as a function of the size of the markets and of
technical change . But each decomposition can in principle be associates to the existence of a
corresponding “market” of the intermediate product. Thus, different decompositions - that is
to say, different degrees of vertical integration or specialization - of productive processes may
correspond to different sets of markets and in this way they can determine, ceteris paribus,
different firms’ size distributions. Thus, it is of course possible to think of a firm which is large
in absolute terms because it is vertically integrated; but it is small with respect to the size of
the final market in which it is active (i.e. with a small fi over a large Mj).
In a fundamental sense, the “thickness” of each market is endogenous to the dynamics
of technologies and institutions. Thus, in the Soviet Union the number of “markets” corre-
sponded at the most to the number of final markets. Conversely, the Italian industrial districts
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is the example that matches more closely the ideal archetype in which to each technical task
corresponds different firms and markets, like in the Smithian parable of pin making. Finally,
as already mentioned, size is influenced by the degree of horizontal diversification of firms
across various markets.
In an extreme synthesis, size distributions depend tautologically- given the size of the
markets - on a) the distribution of market shares in each market; b) the degree of integration
among vertically related activities / markets; c) the degree of horizontal diversification on
different markets.
The question then becomes what are the processes that generate those distributions. Ul-
timately, they concern (i) the dynamics of market shares in each market and (ii) the determi-
nants of the vertical and horizontal boundaries of firms (and their dynamics). In other works
(Dosi, 1991; Dosi and Marengo, 1994; Dosi, Marsili, Orsenigo, and Salvatore, 1995; Dosi,
Malerba, Marsili, and Orsenigo, 1997; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, and Winter, 1994) one discusses
the comparative merits of competing theories which candidate for giving an answer to at least
one of these grand issues. For the purposes of this paper, we shall only propose succinctly our
interpretations and conjectures.
Let us start with the second set of issues concerning the vertical and horizontal boundaries
of firms. This is a particularly delicate question because ultimately it has to do with the very
problem of “what is a firm” jointly with an interpretation of its structure and behaviour. Hero-
ically reducing a particularly complicated object to a telegraphic discussion, we shall assume
that each firm can be conceived as a relatively coherent behavioural entity which embodies
(i) specific problem-solving procedures (that is to say, competences concerning technologies,
management of organizations, marketing, relationships with customers and suppliers, etc..);
b) specific mechanisms governing potentially conflicting interests within the organization itself
and with the interacting entities; and c) specific (almost) strategic orientations, concerning
for example pricing policies, investments, R&D, diversification, etc. (See Dosi and Marengo
(1994), Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, and Winter (1994), Dosi and Coriat (1998)).
Coherent with this definition, our hypothesis is that the potential boundaries of the firms
are approximately determined by its knowledge bases (i.e. by its technological, organisational,
marketing, competences, productive capacity, distribution networks, ...) jointly with the com-
plementary assets controlled by the firm itself (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, and Winter, 1994). The
word potential is crucial: a firm - or even entire systems of firms - can plausibly choose to
explore a very small subset of this potential. On the contrary, one can historically observe
firms which try to overstretch these boundaries in the attempt of compensating factors of
backwardness upstream and downstream, especially in technologically lagging countries.
These potential boundaries are highly conditioned by the sectors of principal activity of
the firms. Various works have begun to provide taxonomies of these patterns. The basic
intuitive idea is almost trivial for non economists (the competences needed for producing a
car are useless for producing biscuits) but its operationalization is much more complex, also
because it is not easy to find non tautological proxies of the very notion of “organisational
competences”).
Within these potential boundaries - we suggest - the actual patterns of vertical integration
and diversification are modulated by factors pertaining to a) alternative governance mech-
anisms of transactions, as in the Williamsonian tradition and b) processes of technical and
organisational division of labour (lato sensu, “Smithian”).
In synthesis: a first restriction on the “measure of firms” comes from the technological
and organisational conditions that influence the non null values of the summation in identity
(9), even though these restrictions still leave ample degrees of behavioural freedom, as the
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comparative evidence from Italy, to the USA to Japan, etc. shows.
3.3 Learning and selection
Given whatever notion of “market” as the domain of competitive interactions a fundamental
question regards the dynamics in the shares in production and sales of individual firms. Fol-
lowing a large body of evolutionary inspired works, we assume that a set of variables which
approximate the specific capabilities of firms map - directly and indirectly - into their compet-
itive performances (often, evolutionary models refer to a “fitness” variable, using a metaphor
perhaps too close to the biological archetype). These variables include obviously the prices
and the performance of products, but also other organisational and spatial dimensions, like
localisation of production, distribution channels, etc. Moreover, these characteristics of indi-
vidual firms influence performance through their behavioural patterns: for example, price-cost
margins, localisation strategies, product positioning in niche vs. mass markets, diversification
vs. specialisation, etc.. At a deeper level, these variables map onto underlying characteristic
traits that constitute the firm itself, i.e. their capabilities.
Come as it may, it is possible to heroically simplify and represent “reduced forms” of
the competitive interactions, in which vectors of firm-specific characteristics, a, influence the
dynamics of their shares. Using a parsimonious representation, let us assume
∆f = g(f, a) (10)
where f is the vector of the firms’ shares and the function g(., .) summarises the interactions
mapping the firms’ technological, organisational, behavioural specific characteristics on the
dynamics of the shares. (In the jargon of many evolutionary models, function g(., .) defines
the fitness landscape on which firms survive, grow, die.). Even more parsimoniously, often
the dynamic models sharing this inspiration collapse all the factors influencing the interactive
dynamics in a “synthetic variable” - “competitiveness” e(.) - , and under further simplifications
they study the properties of markets in which shares monotonically evolve in the differences
between “average competitiveness” e =
∑
i fiei and the specific competitiveness of each firm
∆f = A[ei(t)− e(t)]fi(t) (11)
Let us discuss only some quite general considerations. First, notice that “space” - both lit-
erally and metaphorically referred to product characteristics - contributes to define the shape
of the fitness landscape: ceteris paribus, a perfectly homogenous market will tend to generate
smooth (single peaked) landscapes (lower prices attract more customers) while product dif-
ferentiation will tend to produce many peaks (corresponding to market niches, etc..). Second,
function g(., .) - when it is applied to economic domains - is inevitably influenced by be-
havioural factors. Approximately, the variables determine how much a firm’s competitiveness
can allow it to grow, but actual growth depends also on how much the firm wants to grow;
that is to say its expansion strategies, etc..).
Function g(., .) captures then the “strength” of selection. In the linear form of equation
11, the parameter A determines the reactivity of shares to competitiveness differentials: the
higher is A, the higher are the prizes and the punishments that the market attributes to more
or less competitive firms.
Third, technological and organisational innovation determines the dynamics of the ai for
each firm. This is the essential link between the theory of firms growth on the one hand
and the analysis of technological and organisational change on the other. The patterns of
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the latter determine the structure of the stochastic processes driving the dynamics of firms
competitiveness. In this respect, a now considerable body of work has begun to explore
both empirically and formally different learning regimes and their implications on industrial
dynamics (for empirical analyses, see among others Malerba and Orsenigo (1997) and Breschi,
Malerba, and Orsenigo (2000); for formal models, see Winter (1984), Dosi, Marsili, Orsenigo,
and Salvatore (1995), Winter, Kaniovski, and Dosi (2000), Malerba, Nelson, Winter, and
Orsenigo (1999), Malerba and Orsenigo (2002)).
Let us come back to equation 10 (abstracting for a moment from the fact that growth
can occur also through diversification and vertical integration): the dynamics observed on the
firms’ sizes - captured by θi(t) (see eq. 7) and by εi(t) -, is determined in this interpretation
by an underlying dynamics of learning, i.e. by the processes driving the dynamics of the ai in
equation 10 or, in the simplified version, in the ei in equation 11) jointly with the mechanisms
of competitive selection summarised in the function g(., .).
We can draw here a first general conclusion and - in our view - a challenging and still largely
unexplored conjecture: the coexistence of firms with different size - more specifically the form
of the observed distributions -and their processes of growth can be interpreted on the basis of
the underlying mechanisms of learning and selection. Thus, inter-sectoral, international and
inter-temporal differences can in principle be determined in terms of differences (or changes
over time) in such regimes (jointly with different behavioural patterns which modulate the
differential effects of competitiveness on the propensity to grow, especially in inter-country
comparisons).
In other works (Dosi, Marsili, Orsenigo, and Salvatore, 1995; Winter, Kaniovski, and Dosi,
2000; Malerba, Nelson, Winter, and Orsenigo, 1999; Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002) have started
to analyse the properties of alternative sectoral learning regimes, comparing for example the
“Schumpeter I” archetype (where innovation is essentially driven by new entrants) to the op-
posite “Schumpeter II” paradigm, where incumbents learn in a cumulative way. More recent
attempts include efforts to model industry evolution and firms growth considering also diver-
sification and vertical integration / disintegration (Malerba, Nelson, Orsenigo, and Winter,
2006). Here, the vertical structure of firms is critically affected by the actual distribution of
capabilities across firms in upstream and downstream industries. For example the decision to
specialize is elicited and critically depends on the actual existence of upstream suppliers at
least as competent as the integrated firm itself. Moreover, when products are systems with
various components and subsystems, the ability to coordinate and integrate the design of such
systems and components may constitute an important competence in its own right and a
significant source of competitive advantage Robertson and Langlois (1995). Such advantage
can be (more than) offset by considerations related to the risk of getting stuck in inferior
technological trajectories, especially at times of rapid and uncertain technological change, or
when suppliers are able to offer significantly superior products.
In addition, the vertical scope of firms is influenced by the processes of market selection,
which tends to promote the growth of more efficient firms and of the related organizational
arrangements and to penalize the laggards. Thus, market selection amplifies the impact of
differentiated capabilities on the vertical scope of firms. If specialized firms have superior
capabilities, selection will push for greater specialization; and vice-versa. Or, for instance,
the growth of a competent supplier (or of a vibrant industry) is likely to induce processes
of specialization of the downstream firms, as the supplier becomes able to offer increasingly
better products. In turn, the process and the loci of capability development feed back on the
conditions determining the entry of new firms.
It can be shown that if 1) learning is not too biased against incumbence, 2) the vertical
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boundaries of firms do not dramatically change and 3) there are no “revolutions” in the
balance between “Schumpeter” I and “Schumpeter” II regimes of industrial change then the
distribution of firm sizes in the aggregate turns out to be relatively close to a Pareto one (Dosi
and Salvatore, 1992; Dosi, Marsili, Orsenigo, and Salvatore, 1995).
3.4 Typologies of (small) firms
Up to this point, our discussion of industry structures and their dynamics has been conducted
at a rather abstract level, attempting at identifying some very general properties of the un-
derlying evolutionary processes. More precise empirical characterizations of specific observed
patterns in specific industries and countries require clearly detailed specifications of the learn-
ing regimes, of market interactions and of institutional settings. In the next Section we shall
try to use this simplified conceptual apparatus to discuss some of the main issues related to
the existence of a Third Industrial Revolution. However, it may be useful to begin linking
the foregoing conceptual framework to the following more qualitative discussion by noting
that beyond the analysis of firms size distributions and the changing role of small and large
companies, it is possible to identify different types of firms which can be small. Our previous
discussion suggests indeed that small firms can be the outcome of quite different dynamic
processes. In particular, we can make the following rough distinctions:
• “Marginal” firms, who manage to survive in local markets, often protected by the exer-
cise of monopolistic power by larger and more efficient competitors or “simply” by the
slowness and imperfections of market selection processes (see above Steindl (1945);
• “Chamberlin - Robinson - Hotelling” firms, i.e. small companies that survive and prosper
in small niches of differentiated product markets;
• “Smithian” firms, i.e. firms based on processes of division of labour and specialised in
the supply of intermediate products and components to other (often larger) companies,
often on the basis of organised sub-contracting relations and hierarchies;
• “Marshallian” firms, i.e. companies that are active in a specific geographical area (clus-
ters, districts, productive and innovation systems, etc..). They are typically extremely
specialised in some stage of the value chain and/or in a product niche. They entertain
close - often socially shaped - linkages with the other firms in the area;
• “Schumpeterian” firms, i.e. companies which are born on the basis of an innovation and
try subsequently to develop it. In some cases, these firms grow or are acquired by larger
companies. In most cases, these firms fail. However, these firms are small because they
are young.
These distinctions are overly simplified, of course. For example, a new biotechnology
firm may well be categorized as both a Schumpeterian and a Smithian firm. In some cases
also as a Marshallian one. However, the distinction may remain useful as long as it forces
us to distinguish among different processes and causes of the changes in the organisation of
productive activities and of large corporations in particular.
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4 Continuity and changes in organizational forms,
learning patterns, and competitive processes
The discussion so far has provided evidence and some general conceptualization to understand
the observed changes in the firm size distribution, and consequently in industry structure and
the evolution of firms and industries. In this section we move at an intermediate level of
analysis and address the changes which appear to have indeed occurred in the most recent
period. In particular we shall ask the following questions. What can explain the greater
importance of relatively smaller firms in firm size distributions? And at the same time why
such process of industrial reorganization in favour of smaller size seems to have stopped? What
are the underlying mechanisms explaining these patterns?
In the following, first we argue that the role of smaller firms can be explained, in part, by
the growth of product differentiation and variety. Following the argument in Section 3.2, as
the number of submarkets increase it is more difficult that one firm can dominate a larger,
fragmented market size. The point is straightforward. If a market of size 100 is homoge-
neous, the assets that are necessary to gain market shares in that market are undifferentiated.
Economies of scale and learning processes then might enable one firm to obtain an overall
competitive advantage. By contrast, if the same market is divided into 10 markets of size
10, the assets that are necessary to operate in each market are differentiated, learning across
submarkets is more difficult, and the probability that different firms dominate the different
niches is higher.
The second issue that we address is vertical specialization, the division of “innovative” labor
Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2004), and the patterns of specialization and comparative
advantages of firms of different size in this process. We point out the growing importance
of these processes in high-tech industries, at least in some of them, and therefore suggest
that some of the observed changes in the size distribution of firms that took place in the
1980s and the 1990s may be related to these phenomena. As a related point, we discuss the
emergence of agglomeration of technology-based industries in geographical clusters. Silicon
Valley is a prototypical example. At the same time, the Silicon Valley model, based on high
rates of entry and exit, and a high degree of technological exploration, has diffused in a few
industries to other countries, including newly rising economies like Ireland, Israel, or India
(Bresnahan and Gambardella, 2004; Arora and Gambardella, 2005) Arora and Gambardella,
2005a) The growth of Silicon Valley models may then have given a new impetus to smaller
firms associated with the processes of innovative exploration. Yet, it also produces a new role
for the larger firms as they preserve a comparative advantage in the exploitation of innovative
advances and in incremental innovation, which can even be enhanced by a more productive
exploration process. Moreover, while Silicon Valley is the locus of smaller innovative firms, it
is also the province of some rather large firms, whether established companies, or start-ups
that have grown considerably in the span of a few years. Third, we discuss the existing trends
towards product modularity and the modularity of organizational processes. Once again, the
separability in product components can give rise to specialization and smaller size, because
each individual firm can dominate a single module and does not need to control an entire
product or process space. Yet, modularity requires coordination, and this calls for the role of
larger firms as system integrators. In this respect, coordination is hard to achieve just through
the market, and established corporations, with the appropriate capabilities often dominate an
entire process, are able to master such a system integration activity.
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4.1 Product variety and differentiation: the horizontal boundaries
of firms
A first reason of decreasing average firm sizes can be found in the opportunities for product
differentiation. It is often suggested that increased product variety can be considered a natural
trajectory of economic development - like, as we shall discuss in the next section, division
of labour. Moreover, it is frequently claimed that new technologies, in primis IT, and more
generally post-Fordist patterns of production and demand make significant increases in product
variety possible.
Laser is one example. As discussed by Klepper and Thompson (2007), laser products are
differentiated. This is associated with several market niches. In turn, no firm has been able
to cover a large set of such niches, which has kept the industry from consolidating into a
tight oligopoly. Interestingly, this is the same process suggested by Sutton (1998) with his
flowmeter example. In flowmeters, like in laser, the lack of consolidation does not stem from
the fragmented nature of the technology, whose basic features are common to the application
sectors, but on the fragmentation of the industry downstream. That is, applications of the
same technology are differentiated by the specific requirements of customers and uses. Sutton’s
point is simple. When an industry is not fragmented, economies of scale induce the more
productive firms to cover larger shares of the market. This is because given that they are
more productive they can outcompete their rivals, and when they acquire the competitors’
market share economies of scale make them even more productive. But when a market of
equal size is fragmented, such economies of scale are less prominent because the fixed costs
have to be born for each market niche, or at least learning or economies across niches are less
pronounced than in a homogenous market. As a result, companies can dominate only if they
are better in each and every submarket or in a large number of them. This is unlikely in so
far as different companies develop specific capabilities in different sub-markets. As a result,
a structure in which one firm covers the entire market - i.e. the full set of sub-markets or a
large share thereof - is less likely then in the case of more homogenous final products.
In a more dynamic, evolutionary perspective, this argument can be recast in terms of
learning and capabilities. Take the example of pharmaceuticals. Here, research capabilities
developed for one product - e.g. a drug for the treatment of hypertension - might be of
limited use for the search of say, Parkinson treatments. In fact, capabilities are likely to
be accumulated incrementally and this is reflected also by the pace of diversification across
submarkets.15 That is to say, the horizontal boundaries of firms are defined by their capabilities
in differentiated markets.
4.2 Smith, Marshall, and Schumpeter: the vertical boundaries of
firms
A second category of processes driving changes in firm sizes, and firm boundaries involves
changing patterns of division of labour. There is little question that division of labour and
specialisation constitute a fundamental secular tendency in economic activities. From Adam
Smith to Allyn Young and Herbert Simon, the notion that division of labour is a crucial
“natural” engine of productivity growth is probably one of the less disputed propositions in
economics. Indeed, it is a major stylized fact in the history of industries, technologies and
15In the case of the pharmaceutical industry Bottazzi and Secchi (2006) show that the diversification patterns
can be well described by a branching process.
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business enterprises that progress occurs also through significant processes of specialisation.
The history of the mechanical and electro-mechanical industries are typical examples. In this
respect, the birth and diffusion of specialised firms - what we have labeled as the “Smithian
firms” - is by no means a new phenomenon (Pavitt, 1998). And, other things being equal, one
would expect such processes to be favored by growing and more integrated markets (in line
with the Smithian adagio that the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market).
However, it is important to distinguish between drivers of processes of division of labour.
One process concerns the “natural” tendency towards increasing specialisation that occurs
along an industry life cycle / a technological trajectory whereby as a technological paradigm
matures intermediate inputs tend to become more standardized, economies of scale in pro-
duction become more relevant and the emergence of specialized producers gets easier. A
significantly different question regards the extent to which specific new technologies tend in-
trinsically to favour more decentralized forms of organisation as compared to more vertically
integrated structures. In this respect, it has been suggested that the ICT revolution sys-
tematically favors vertical disintegration and arm-length form of coordination of what were
previously integrated units (this is also part of Langlois’ argument on the “vanishing hand”
of big integrated corporations).
Certainly, in both scale-intensive and science-based sectors the application of information
technologies to design and production has fostered concepts and practices like product modu-
larity (since IBM’s system 360), which has in turn affected organizational modularity (Sanchez
and Mahoney, 1996; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001).
Together vertical specialization has become more prominent also in some high-tech indus-
tries (e.g. semiconductors, and even pharmaceuticals). In particular, as suggested by Arora,
Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2004), one observes a tendency towards an increasing division of
“innovative” labour. The process is particularly evident in sectors like software, semiconduc-
tors - with the development of the fabless firms - and in the bio-pharmaceutical industry.
More generally, the advent of the ICT revolution has offered not only opportunities for
the discovery and development of new products and processes, but has often entailed major
organizational innovations. There is no need to emphasize how the diffusion of information
technologies has made it possible major organisational transformations, ranging from so-called
“flexible automation”, to modularization, to e-commerce, and in general to the possibility of
decentralization of certain activities previously carried out within the boundaries of individual
firms.
The acknowledgment of the foregoing “Smithian” tendencies is sometimes complemented
by a “Marshallian” argument. Not only the large, vertically integrated corporation, it is ar-
gued, has become less efficient than more decentralized and specialised structures interacting
in the production process, but such collections of specialised firms have also specific spatial
connotations, i.e. spatial concentration of economic activities confers “externality” advan-
tages to those firms. Despite their enormous differences, the emphasis on both “Smithian”
and “Marshallian” tendencies is an ingredient of the argument which would tend to suggest
that a “Third Industrial Revolution” did occur or is occurring involving the demise of the
vertically and horizontally integrated corporation in favour of networks of small(er), highly
specialised firms interacting together in the invention, development, production and marketing
of products. While both the Smithian (vertical specialization) and the Marshallian (Silicon
Valley) type processes would seem to have become more prominent than in the past, these
points have to be qualified. First, as noted by our data, the trend towards smaller firm size is
perceptible but not so dramatic to call for a revolution in the distribution of firm sizes. This
observation is more consistent with secular Smithian processes of division of labour, rather
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than with the thesis of a drastic revolution favouring smaller size of firms.
Second, Marshallian clusters of small firms are again certainly not a new phenomenon.
Even assuming that Marshallian clusters have actually become increasingly important as com-
pared to the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, it must be recognised that Silicon Valley
itself is not simply the paradise of small entrepreneurs and small companies. It is also the
locus of some of the largest firms worldwide in addition of course to many smaller ones.
A related but distinct question concerns whether a new model of organisation of large
corporations - loosely definable as the “network” form - is supplanting the Chandlerian-Fordist
one.
The statistical evidence discussed in section 2 above on the relative stickiness of size distri-
butions throughout the current technological revolution throw doubts on such an hypothesis.
If anything, as the data on the distribution of firms’ size show, the ratio of what is produced
within the boundaries of firms and what is exchanged via market transactions would appear
to have remained fairly constant or only slightly decreasing.
Yet, there is certainly ample evidence, both anecdotal and based on rigorous case studies of
firms and industries, indicating that vertical disintegration, outsourcing and de-conglomeration
are actually very important tendencies in the organisation of innovative and productive activ-
ities in many industries suggesting some discontinuity vis a´ vis the Chandlerian/ Fordist past.
Our interpretative suggestion is indeed that such discontinuity regards more the ways large
firms are organized, managed, and interact with the environment that surrounds them than
in the fact that they have been replaced by systems of smaller firms.
Once again, it could be argued that none of these processes is entirely new. As Langlois
(2003) notes the rise of the multidivisional firm was itself at one level a Smithian process,
i.e. an attempt at decoupling and separating vertically- and horizontally-related activities,
through the professionalization of management and through the separation of strategy from
day-to-day operations. Also modularity and division of innovative labour are not completely
new phenomena. Langlois (2002) and Robertson and Langlois (1995) have shown that in the
PC as well as in the hi-fi industries products evolved from unitary ”blocks” to systems of
thousands of components which in turn yielded an increasing inter-organizational division of
labour across specialist firms. With regards to the distribution of innovative labor Mueller
(1962) noted that well inside the “Chandlerian era” most of the important innovations by
DuPont originated outside DuPont: ideas or early prototypes were often generated by others,
typically smaller concerns. Likewise, Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2007) have shown that vibrant
markets for technology existed and prospered more than one century ago in the USA.
Yet, it can be legitimately argued that these tendencies have become more widespread
than in the past and that their scale has increased so much to raise the question if they are
manifestations of epochal changes in the organisation of large firms, involving a greater re-
liance on outsourcing, a greater importance of markets for technology and greater degrees of
organizational decentralization. Let us start from the former. Outsourcing is an increasingly
important phenomenon, as epitomized by the growing fears of countries like the US or even
Europe for the movement of jobs outside their own national boundaries towards new locations
in China, India or Asia more generally. In fact, the concerns go beyond outsourcing in tra-
ditional sectors, experiencing a “natural” industrial life cycles and regard outsourcing of jobs
in more advanced industries in which the US or other advanced countries could still retain
comparative advantages when judged by the lens of the life cycle story. At the same time,
there is good evidence that licensing deals have increased significantly worldwide since 1990,
and that markets for technology are rising (Athreye and Cantwell, 2007; Arora, Fosfuri, and
Gambardella, 2004). Yet, our point is that these very same processes have not pushed unilat-
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erally towards a greater importance of smaller firms and decentralized networks as opposed
to larger integrated firms.
Of course outsourcing as such might not affect the “size” of firms when measured in terms
of sales but should do so when measured in terms of value added: still there is no systematic
evidence to our knowledge, of a trend in this direction.
4.3 The dynamics of exploration and exploitation
A particularly important issue regards the relationship between specialized (small) firms and
integrated (plausibly bigger) ones with respect to the division of innovative labor. The tricky
issue here can be read in terms of the trade offs between exploration of new innovative knowl-
edge and its exploitation on the one hand and between decentralization and coordination, on
the other. Start by noting that whenever the innovative process does not require significant
complementary assets such as manufacturing facilities etc. (Teece, 1986), “Smithian” vertical
disintegration, “Schumpeterian” technology markets, and the Marshallian Silicon Valleys, are
likely to enhance the degree of exploration. If the development of an innovation requires in-
tegration with downstream manufacturing or commercialization assets, only the firms owning
these assets can innovate. But this sets an upper bound to the number of innovators. By
contrast, as Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2004) point out, if vertical specialization, and
related separation, are possible in different organizations, between activities for producing
innovations and activities for developing them, there are more innovation ”trials”. This is be-
cause “ideas” can be tried out at low fixed costs. Put simply, without separability, innovation
producers have to have the downstream assets, and innovation users have to have the ability
to produce innovations. Separation between these stages of the innovation process makes it
possible for the “explorers” to pursue innovative search even if they do not have the costly
downstream assets. It is of course not at all clear ex ante whether new ideas will become
profitable for someone else to buy and exploit it. But the failure rates are only limited to
the research assets and not to the downstream production or commercialization networks. In
some cases - e.g. new software programs - these innovation trial costs can be rather small.
All this leads to more innovation trials, because it is less costly to do so, and hence there are
lower barriers to entry in the exploration activities.
The obvious consequence of the higher degree of exploration and of the higher number of
potential innovations is that technological opportunities are tapped more intensively. Under
this scenario the very process of vertical specialization means that the firms with the capabil-
ities to develop new products downstream can access a wider set of the innovation input more
productively. This makes them more productive, and reinforces their comparative advantage
and consequently their role in the vertical division of labour. In short, the very success of
smaller decentralized firms (“upstream”), and the very fact that these firms are part of a
broader process that involves larger more integrated companies (“downstream”) makes also
the latter more effective. In sum, if anything, we ought to observe that larger firms become
key agents downstream or in R&D activities that require large scale.
Clearly under this scenario vertical disintegration of innovative labour does not necessarily
involves a changing balance between small and big firms but just a different pattern of division
of labour among them. There is however a downside to this set-up.
In the vertical structure we have described, even if more “ideas” are explored, one is
bound to bear the costs of having a fragmented structure for innovation, as opposed to a more
integrated one. More integrated structures may improve learning processes, which under
vertical disintegration are harder to pursue because knowledge is dispersed in many different
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uncoordinated avenues, across many smaller independent firms. The point is made by Pisano
(2006) with respect to biotech firms but we think that such trade-off - i.e. greater exploration
at the expense of better more consolidated learning processes along fewer but well defined
trajectories - is an important one, which goes beyond the confines of the drug industry.
Indeed, the current technological revolution (as other ones in the past: see Perez (2007) has
been associated with a surge of entry of small innovative companies which ultimately has led to
the dotcom bubble. There are signs of an increasing appreciation of the potential advantages
from greater integration in recent years. For example, the nanotechnology business seems to
be the province of firms that are still small compared to the larger established oligopolists
of the world, but are also larger and more integrated than many biotech entities. To the
extent that these tendencies are there to stay, they suggests that we ought to observe some
reintegration in the near future. Our hanch is that again this will not make a revolution in
the pattern of division of innovative labour. But the extent of exploration may cyclically leave
room to a greater degree of exploitation, and this would resurrect the role of “exploitative
vis-a´-vis explorative firms”. Once again, the trends of the past two decades are not likely
to be the beginning of a secular dynamics but rather part of repeated historical swings from
“excessive” fragmentation - often associated with the decentralized activities of exploration
typical of the emergence of new technological paradigms -, to “excessive” integration - and
thus the dominance of “exploitation” and incremental innovation, often characteristics of more
mature technological paradigm.
4.4 Modularisation and the division of innovative labour: integra-
tion and the Visible Hand
Another side of trade-off specialisation/ integration has to do with the need for coordination,
even in the presence of processes of modularization and of division of innovative labour. In
this respect, it is often argued that, by adopting modular design strategies, firms can take
responsibility for the design and development of separate modules. Thus, they can develop
new products at a faster pace, as the integration of the final product is a matter of mix and
match of ‘black boxes’ (Baldwin and Clark, 2001, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). This
is made possible by advanced technological knowledge about component interactions that can
be used to fully specify and standardize component inter-faces and, therefore, to decouple the
design of the product architecture (i.e. arrangement of functional elements) from the design
of each module. Modularity, by simplifying design and development processes, would allow a
greater division of labour across firms. As a consequence, firms can focus their capabilities on
few modules or on the architecture.
However, modularity implies a trade-off between the ‘speed’ of search (enabled by modu-
larity) and the ‘breadth’ of search (enabled by non-modular search strategies). Apparently,
modular search strategies are indeed highly efficient in the short term (i.e., they provide ‘higher
value’) enabling fast searches within a predefined search space. However, these gains might
disappear in the long term, as ‘slower’ (i.e., less modular) search strategies catch up and reach
better solutions as they can explore wider search spaces, exactly because they rely on less
tightly defined ‘design rules’. Thus, in dynamic terms, modularity may entail some risks:
firms may miss value-generating alternatives because they cannot escape the boundaries set
by the existing modular design strategies (Brusoni, Prencipe, and Pavitt, 2001)16.
In this respect, modularization, while “simplifying” the problem of searching for better
16Some of these properties are formally explored and are corroborated in Marengo and Dosi (2005)
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design and fostering division of labour calls at the same time for an increasing role played
by systems integrators, who remain involved in exploratory research that looks beyond the
boundaries set by current architectures in order to be able to lead the process of development
of successive generations of systems. Put it another way, increasing specialisation generated
by modularity requires the development of more centralized agents who “coordinate” the
integration of different modules and - even more important - the development of new systems.
We noted in the previous section that the greater opportunity to separate research from
development and production and the possibility to define specific intermediate research out-
puts to be transferred across organizations implies that the scale at which individuals can
experiment their innovations in the economy has increased. In turn, this explains some of
the factors discussed earlier, viz. high-tech entrepreneurship, turbulence (higher entry and
exit rates), and higher the rate of innovation which is a natural outcome of the greater num-
ber of trials. Moreover, as noted, the picture that emerge from this process is one in which
dynamically one expects a balance going on over time between exploration and exploitation,
especially in technology-based industries, with the smaller firms occupying a higher share of
the domain of exploration.
However, in other respects, large corporations do not simply specialize in the development
of innovations created by others. They perform at the same time the crucial role of integrators
of fragments of specialised knowledge, building up architectures or frames which organize and
structure the knowledge required to develop, produce and sell new products. Even in the case
of biotechnology, large firms appear as central nodes in a hierarchically structured network of
relationships (Orsenigo, Pammolli, and Riccaboni, 2001), whose density remains practically
stable. As the network grows bigger through the entry of new agents, other relationships
consolidate and some agents increase their centrality.
Put it another way, division of labour and decentralization (the expansion of the network)
require at the same time stronger integration and coordination within the nodes of the net-
work. As some activities are outsourced, their coordination implies the development of highly
structured functions dedicated to their management and to the achievement of coherence and
integration. In other words, division of labour does not simply reduce the need for managerial
control, but shifts it at different levels. Thus, the management of supply chains does not elim-
inate the need for hierarchical control. If anything, it changes its nature and its practices. But
one could legitimately argue that the management of supply chains is a more organisationally
complex activity than straightforward vertical integration.
In this perspective, the Visible Hand is not disappearing. Perhaps it is becoming smaller
and the grip of its fist is relaxing. But its strength is not weakened: its grip is perhaps
smoother but firmer.
4.5 Innovation, entrepreneurial firms and the life cycle of industries
To conclude the analysis of this Section it is important to remark that the balance between
exploration and exploitation, or decentralization and coordination, often depends on the stage
of the industry life cycles, with the early stages favoring exploration and the production of
many new technologies or ideas (Klepper, 1996, 2002). As shown by Klepper (2002), even
an industry as concentrated as automobiles was highly fragmented when it started, with a
great deal of entry and exit. A shake-out then gradually reduced the number of suppliers.
The internet boom of the 1990s was a similar process. Too many firms were created and
the shake-out of the early 2000 adjusted its industry structure. Even if the Industry Life
Cycle model should not be taken as a model applicable to all industries or products (as
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Klepper himself easily acknowledges, Klepper, 1997), technological revolutions open up new
rich technological opportunities to be explored and exploited by both small and large firms.
The space of opportunities is often so wide and complex, that no single organisation can hope
to be able to explore it extensively. Competing (and complementary) directions of search have
to be tested and developed, before but - to a lesser extent - also after the establishment of
specific paradigms and trajectories (Dosi, 1982). Thus, even without assuming any intrinsic
advantage of size or age, periods of technological transitions are typically marked by entry
of new firms and turbulence (Orsenigo, Pammolli, and Riccaboni, 2001). In addition, in
many cases, new companies are the carriers of new technologies, precisely because incumbents
embody old knowledge bases which makes it harder for them to grasp and master the new
ones (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995). Thus, some of the new firms are able to displace
old leaders. The advantages of the new companies are not linked to their small size, though:
rather they are small because they are young and successful ones will grow larger. Thus,
some of the large firms that have become prominent worldwide are new firms in a long-term
perspective. This is especially true of the information technology (IT) firms - e.g. Microsoft,
Cisco, Sun Microsystem.
Moreover, it is not always the case that new firms inevitably end up dominating the indus-
try. In many instances, incumbents are able to survive technological disruptions and maintain
their leadership: to a significant extent, for example, this is the case of pharmaceuticals after
the biotechnology revolution (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994;
Henderson, Orsenigo, and Pisano, 1999). In this respect, increased entry of Schumpeterian,
innovative firms is indeed likely to be linked to the advent of major technological revolu-
tions like those occurring in ICT and life sciences. However, specifically with reference to the
contemporary “technological revolution” this phenomenon is also likely to be linked to insti-
tutional changes which have little to do with technological change as such. For example, the
diffusion of a tight IPR regime especially in the USA has certainly favoured the development
of the biotechnology industry as an organisational solution alternative to more direct use of
the knowledge created in universities by large corporations.17
It is worth noting that this outcome is not obviously and necessarily efficient (Pisano,
2006): very few of these companies are profitable and most of them survive as specialised
suppliers of a particular intermediate good - new promising molecules or research techniques
- to large pharmaceutical corporations.
5 Conclusion
Long ago, Herbert Simon (Simon, 1991, pp. 27-28) suggested the following thought exper-
iment. Suppose that each inter-organizational interaction is flagged with a green color and
each market transaction with a red one. Allow some visitor from outer space to approach the
earth. What will he see? Simon answer was: a lot of continents and islands with the green
color interlinked with many, thick and thin, red lines.
Has the picture changed since Simon’s original answer? Our bird-eye statistical answer is:
not too much, if at all. Hence, if the question of whether there has been a “Third Industrial
Revolution” is posed in terms of overall balances between the activities which are integrated
17Likewise, entrepreneurship has been buttressed by a host of supporting policies ranging from public pro-
curement to specific programs -e.g. SBIR in the USA. In other words, there may be institutional factors, fads,
or simply path-dependent phenomena that may exacerbate problems of excessive exploration or, by the same
token, of excessive exploitation at other moments in time.
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within organizations and those which occur through market interactions, the answer is largely
negative. Of course, we do not know how to measure the types of interaction. However, if
we reasonably assume that the bigger a firm is the higher the number of intra-organizational
interactions it contains, than the evidence on the relative stability of size distributions offers
a strong support to the point.
At closer look, however, many things have changed, both as “normal” outcomes of the
processes of creative destruction / creative accumulation, and as specific features of the new
techno-economic paradigm.
In the foregoing image, some continents have shrunk or even disappeared while some (old
and new) islands have grown to the size of continents.
Hence, first, not too surprisingly, “life cycle” phenomena imply that the seemingly dom-
inant firms in 1900 (including in the U.S. some associated with the distribution of ice bars
in New England!) are almost entirely different from those one observes in say, Fortune 500
today. At the same time, one observes the emergence of the Intel, Microsoft (and also Boeing
and Airbus, etc.) of the current world.
Second, at an even closer look at the image resolution of our outer-space observer, one sees
significant, persistent, fluctuations in the location of innovative activities among “continents”
and “islands” of different sizes and ages. Enough to corroborate the notion of a “Third
Industrial Revolution”? Certainly, the technological breakthroughs militates in favour of the
“revolutionary” hypothesis. The organization picture is rather more blurred. Within the co-
evolutionary dynamics of technologies, sectors and firms, “revolutions” are harder to see from
the angle of the distribution of activities left respectively to the ”visible hand” of organizations
and the “invisible hand” of market interactions.
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Technical Appendix and data description
The analysis on Italian firms has been performed on Micro.1 database.18 MICRO.1 contains
longitudinal data on a panel of several thousands of Italian firms with employment of 20 units
or more and it covers the years 1989-97.
As reported in Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004) the percentage of manu-
facturing firms with more than 20 employees is the 12% of the total population. However,
these relative larger companies account for almost 70% in terms of employment. The empirical
analysis performed in figures 4 draws upon firms in manufacturing sectors only.
Table 2 and Figure 4 and 5 report the Zipf fit of sectors grouped according to Pavitt
taxonomy (Pavitt, 1984). The mapping of industrial activity to the corresponding “Pavitt
sectors” has been adapted to the Italian standard ATECO, of whom NACE is an almost
perfectly overlapping classification19. Table 7 reports such correspondence, which has been
applied also to French data, since their standard (Nomenclature d’Activite´s Franc¸aise - NAF)
perfectly maps the ATECO one at the 3 digit level.
Results presented on French firms make use of the EAE databank collected by SESSI and
provided by the French Statistical Office (INSEE). This database contains longitudinal data
on a virtually exhaustive panel of French firms with 20 employees or more over the period
1989-2002. We restrict our analysis to the manufacturing sectors. For statistical consistency,
we only utilize the period 1996-2003 and we consider only continuing firms over this period.
Database characteristics are described in greater detail in Bottazzi, Coad, Jacoby, and Secchi
(2005).
The analysis of size distribution and concentration ratio of world’s largest firm have em-
ployed data collected in the database Osiris (2005).20
Table 3 and 4 report data on firm and employee distribution per size class as one might
recover from publicly available statistics published by OECD, Eurostat and some National Sta-
tistical Office. Figures on earlier years for European countries and Japan have been retrieved
from OECD sources (OECD, 1994, 1995). Data on more recent years have been collected for
Europe from the “Industry, trade and services” statistics released yearly by Eurostat (EURO-
STAT, 2006) and for Japan from the “Establishments and Enterprise Census” at the Statics
Bureau of Japan (Japan, 2006).
For USA it has been possible to access the “Enterprise statistics” of the Bureau of Census
starting from 1958 onward thanks to the access granted to their archives. After with 1988
data are recovered from Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) (CENSUS, 2006).
18The database has been made available to our team under the mandatory condition of censorship of any
individual information. One of the author gratefully acknowledges Istat for data provision.
19International comparisons among various classification standard are permanently available, in addition to
national statistical office, at the United Nations Statistics Division http : //unstats.un.org/unsd/
20Access to this database was kindly granted to one of the author while visiting at the University of Penn-
sylvania.
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ISIC SECTOR
Supply
Dominated
Scale
Intensive
Special
Suppliers
Science
Based
151 Production, processing and preserving of meat
√
155 Dairy products
√
158 Production of other foodstuffs (brad, sugar, etc...)
√
159 Production of beverages (alcoholic and not)
√
171 Preparation and spinning of textiles
√
172 Textiles weaving
√
173 Finishing of textiles
√
175 Carpets, rugs and other textiles
√
177 Knitted and crocheted articles
√
182 Wearing apparel
√
191 Tanning and dressing of leather
√
193 Footwear
√
202 Production of plywood and panels
√
203 Wood products for construction
√
205 Production of other wood products (cork, straw, etc.)
√
211 Pulp, paper and paperboard
√
212 Articles of paper and paperboard
√
221 Publishing
√
222 Printing
√
241 Production of basic chemicals
√
243 Paints, varnishes, printing inks and mastics
√
244 Pharmaceut., medicinal chemicals and botanical prod.
√
245 Soap and detergents, cleaning and toilet preparations
√
246 Other chemical products
√
251 Rubber products
√
252 Plastic products
√
261 Glass and glass products
√
262 Ceramic goods not for construction
√
263 Ceramic goods for construction
√
264 Bricks, tiles and construction products in baked clay
√
266 Articles in concrete, plaster and cement
√
267 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone
√
273 First processing of iron and steel
√
275 Casting of metals
√
281 Structural metal products
√
284 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal
√
285 Treatment and coating of metals
√
286 Cutlery, tools and general hardware
√
287 Other fabricated metal products
291 Machinery for production and use of mechanical power
√
292 Other general purpose machinery
√
293 Agricultural and forestry machinery
√
294 Machine tools
√
295 Other special purpose machinery
√
297 Domestic appliances not elsewhere classified
√
311 Electric motors, generators and transformers
√
312 Manufacture of electricity distribution, control equip.
√
316 Electrical equipment not elsewhere classified
√
322 TV, radio transmitters, lines for telephony, telegraphy
√
332 Measure, control and navigation instruments
√
342 Production of bodies for cars, trailers, semi-trailers
√
343 Production of spare parts and accessories for cars
√
361 Furniture
√
Table 7: Mapping of industrial activities to the corresponding “Pavitt sectors”
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